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Introduction
Paul (2001), Shimer and Smith (2000) , Shimer (2001) , Prat (2002) ). This literature highlights the role of technological complementarity and spillovers among workers for a segregation of Þrms by their workers' skill. (For a comprehensive review of the less recent literature on job assignment, see Sattinger (1993) .) In contrast, this paper derives asymmetric equilibria with respect to the sorting of skills from product market characteristics, by accounting for the role of intangible assets for the performance of Þrms.
The work of Rosen (1982) and Saint-Paul (2001) are most closely related to the present analysis. Saint-Paul (2001) shows that, by allowing for intra-Þrm spillovers when output of a homogenous good is a function of an aggregate skill index, typically, the equilibrium assignment of workers is segregated and the wage distribution skewed to the right. He applies his model to analyze the impact of new information technology on segmentation and wage inequality. Thus, his focus is very different from the present multi-market context in which managerial quality is the key to create valuable intangible assets and the sorting equilibrium depends on product market characteristics. Rosen (1982) examines the relationship between Þrm size, managerial job assignment and managerial wages by focussing on the supervisory role of management. In his analysis, good managers sort in large Þrms and receive high rewards because of a technological complementarity between supervising skills and the span of control. In contrast, in the present analysis, for Þrms to be large in the Þrst place they have to attract good managers who create valuable intangible assets. Moreover, the present paper also studies the number of establishments as measure for Þrm size, in addition to output, sales or employment.
Results are consistent with the following patterns which are discussed in more detail at the end of this paper. (i) The size distribution of Þrms and plants within industries is highly skewed to the right (e.g., Sutton (1997) ); (ii) both larger Þrms and Þrms with higher market shares are more proÞtable (e.g., Schmalensee, 1989); (iii) there is a substantial degree of heterogeneity among Þrms and establishments with respect to productivity levels, with larger Þrms and plants being more productive (e.g., Bartelsman and Doms (2000) ); (iv) larger Þrms employ better workers (e.g.,
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Troske (1999)), and, particularly, average managerial skill levels substantially differ across Þrms (e.g., O'Shaughnessy, Levine and Capelli (2001) ); Þnally, (v) larger Þrms pay substantially higher managerial wages (e.g., Conyon and Murphy (2000) ).
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the model is presented and its crucial assumptions are discussed. Section 3 deÞnes the equilibrium and characterizes market ranges, proÞts, the assignment of managers and the measure of Þrms in equilibrium. Section 4 illustrates both the results and the equilibrium concept by specifying the nature of imperfect competition in the multiple goods markets.
Section 5 shows how the results derived from the model relate to the observed patterns (i)-(v) above. Section 6 summarizes the main results. All proofs and extensive derivations are relegated to an appendix.
The Model
This section presents the model and discusses its main assumptions.
Set Up
Firms are characterized by intangible assets which affect the Þrms' productivity or (perceived) product quality, respectively. There is a large number of potential entrants in the economy and entry is free. Let I = [0, I] be the set of Þrms which actually enter. Firms are proÞt-maximizers.
Labor supply is inelastic and normalized to unity. Workers differ in their ability h to develop intangible assets, called managerial skill level. Let g(h) be the mass function of the distribution of skill supply, with support being the set H = {h 0 , h 1 , ..., h K }, 0 ≤ h 0 < h 1 < ... < h K < ∞. There exists an outside earnings optionW ≥ 0 for types when not being assigned as manager, i.e., with respect to all non-managerial tasks, labor is homogenous (see, e.g., Lucas (1978) ). In the general equilibrium examples of section 4,W is the wage rate for production workers. Firms take wages w(h), h ∈ H, as given; there is a Walrasian auctioneer in the labor market, implementing a wage schedule which fulÞlls equilibrium conditions as deÞned 5 in section 3.3 below (see DeÞnition 2). Workers seek the highest wage.
Firms may (endogenously) differ in a single parameter α i , i ∈ I, called quality of intangible assets. Intangible assets are created in the Þrms' head departments which consist of an exogenous mass ("size") s of managerial workers, with 0 < s ≤ g(h)
for all h ∈ H. The quality index α i is determined by the average managerial skill level in the head department of Þrm i, denoted byh i ∈ H = [h 0 , h K ]. Formally, let a : H → R + be a strictly monotonic increasing and twice continuously differentiable function, so that
There is a continuum of market locations ("markets"), indexed by m, which are represented as points in the unit interval [0, 1] . In order to produce and sell products in a single market, Þrms have to incur set up costs, e.g., for opening up a plant or branch, introducing a marketing campaign at a location or costs associated with red tape. It is assumed that these costs only depend on the measure of markets in which a Þrm decides to operate, called market range. Let α, M and q denote mappings which assign to each Þrm i a quality of intangible assets α i , a set of markets M i in which the Þrm is active and a corresponding market range q i , respectively, i ∈ I. The timing of events evolves according to the following stages, with decisions at each stage made simultaneously by Þrms.
• At stage 1, each Þrm i ∈ I creates intangible assets by hiring managers from 3 The size s of head departments could be treated as choice variable of Þrms by replacing (1) by
is not ever increasing in s (holdingh i constant). (Such a limitation of size advantages can be justiÞed by internal coordination problems which imply that a Þrm's head department has an optimal size.) This would not alter the main conclusions of this paper, but would considerably complicate the analysis. For simplicity, s is exogenous here.
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the set H, which determines α, according to equation (1). Wage costs for managers are sunk at later stages.
• At stage 2, Þrms decide in which markets to be active, i.e., each Þrm i ∈ I chooses a set M i ∈ M, which determines M and q, respectively.
• At stage 3, Þrms enter product market competition.
The analysis is not restricted to a particular type of imperfect competition model but generally applies to any form of imperfect product market competition in which intangible assets matter for the performance of Þrms. The role of intangible assets for the proÞts of Þrms at stage 3 is speciÞed as follows. Denote proÞt realizations of Þrm i from product market competition at stage 3 in market m by π i,m . The mapping M, which assigns a set of markets M i to each Þrm i ∈ I, determines for
If Þrm i does not enter market m, proÞts at stage 3 in this market are zero, i.e.,
depends on the Þrm's strength α i and on the competitive pressure exerted by its rivals.
A higher quality α i raises π i,m in any market m ∈ M i (in which Þrm i is active)
similarly. This reßects the idea that intangible assets are geographical non-rival (as discussed in section 2.2). Competitive pressure in a market m depends on the strengths of rivals α j , j ∈ N m , j 6 = i. Thus, generally, proÞts at stage 3 in each market m depend on α, i.e., on the quality levels of intangible assets developed at stage 1, and on the mappings M, q, resulting from the Þrms' decisions at stage 2 about which and how many markets to enter. The analysis focusses on (equilibrium) situations in which, given α, for any q, the proÞt-maximizing choices of market sets M i at stage 2 are such that each Þrm earns the same proÞt at stage 3 in any market it is active. More formally, let z ≡ (α, q) denote the mapping which assigns a pair (α i , q i ) to each Þrm i; then, one can write π i,m = π(α i | z) if i ∈ N m . As a consequence, the proÞt prospects π i,m faced by a Þrm when deciding about α i and q i depend on z, not on speciÞc conditions in single markets. 4 Since single Þrms 4 To see this, consider a situation in which competitive pressure differs across markets. Suppose 7 have measure zero, competitive pressure under (α 0 , q 0 ) is the same as under (α, q)
i ≥ q i with at least one strict inequality holding for a positive mass of Þrms i ∈ I. For instance, suppose there are two types of Þrms, indexed k = 0, 1, and denote the respective set of Þrms by I 0 and I 1 , respectively; i.e.,
Then, for all i ∈ N m and for all m ∈ [0, 1], Assumption 1. For any z = (α, q) there exists a real-valued function π(α i | z),
, and π satisÞes the following properties: (i)
Assumption 1 greatly simpliÞes the analysis, as the decision problem of each Þrm i ∈ I at stage 2 can be reduced to the choice of market ranges q i rather than the choice of the entire sets M i .
Note that the Þrm's objective function at stage 2 is the sum of Þrm i's proÞts at stage 3 over all single markets in which it is active minus total entry costs Q(q i ).
As Þrms have a negligible impact, they correctly take z as given at stage 2. Thus, Assumption 1 implies that, given z, the optimal choice of range q i of a Þrm which has created a quality of intangible assets α i at stage 1 readŝ 
Discussion of the Set Up
Before beginning the equilibrium analysis, let me brießy discuss the set up of the model.
Managerial Skills and Intangible Assets
It is assumed that intangible assets have to be developed ex ante by managerial labor. For instance, managerial activities include the creation of analytical databases and intra-Þrm networks, which support the design of products, customer services and marketing strategies (e.g., Bresnahan (1999) ). These tasks affect the (perceived) quality of goods. Moreover, managerial abilities affect the efficiency of the organizational structure of a Þrm (and, thus, productivity) by developing management techniques and Þrm-speciÞc human capital (human resource management). Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that "managerial quality may be an important factor behind productivity heterogeneity" (Bartelsman and Doms (2000, p. 587) ). As the creation of intangible assets relate to R&D and marketing activities, taking place prior to product market competition, the model borrows from the IO literature on investment games by treating corresponding outlays as endogenous sunk costs (e.g., Sutton (1982, 1983) , Sutton (1998) ). In fact, the present model allows one to lead back endogenous sunk costs (i.e., managerial wages) to individual characteristics, accounting for individual heterogeneity and observing resource constraints.
Geographical Non-rivalry of Intangible Assets
According to the set up of section 2.1, the quality of intangible assets, α i , is Þrm-speciÞc, rather than plant-speciÞc. This reßects the public good nature of intangible assets from the perspective of a Þrm (therefore often called "common assets" in the literature). For instance, α i corresponds to the perceived quality of the product(s)
of Þrm i in any market it chooses to be active. In this case, α i can be interpreted as the consumers' valuation of Þrm i's product design(s) or trademark. According to the literature on the boundaries of (multi-plant) Þrms, intangible assets give rise to ownership advantages. 5 In particular, this applies to multinational Þrms. In fact,
Þrms in advertising-intensive industries are more likely to incur foreign direct investment (Martin (1991) ). Moreover, Þrm-speciÞc marketing advantages and trademarked goods induce Þrms to "globalize" (e.g., Markusen (1995) , Wong (1995) ). As another example, think about α i as productivity of Þrm i. In fact, empirical evidence suggests that productivity in single plants of a Þrm is positively related to the productivity of the headquarter of this Þrm (Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992) (1937) ). Reasons include diseconomies of scale in governing plants (Porter (1986)) and costs of bureaucracies (Williamson (1975) ).
Equilibrium Analysis
This section solves the model by backward induction. The solution characterizes market ranges, proÞts, the wage structure, the assignment of ability types to Þrms and the measure of Þrms in an equilibrium.
Product Market Competition (Stage 3)
Product market competition at stage 3 takes place in each market m ∈ [0, 1] separately, with the set of Þrms I, the qualities of intangible assets α and market ranges q being already determined. According to Assumption 1, this leads to proÞt realizations π( α i | z) of a Þrm with strength α i in any market it is active, given the competitive pressure in the economy under z = (α, q).
Firms' Choice of Markets (Stage 2)
Optimal behavior of Þrms i ∈ I at stage 2, after creation of intangible assets at stage 1, is given by (2). This implies the following for an equilibrium at stage 2.
DeÞnition 1. (Equilibrium at stage 2). Given the set of Þrms I and the mapping α, in an equilibrium, we havez = (α,q) withq i =q(α i |z), i ∈ I.
As Þrms take z as given when choosing market ranges, in equilibrium, the optimal choices of Þrms' market range, given byq, must be consistent with the resulting competitive pressure under these optimal choices, i.e.,z = (α,q). 8 Equilibrium proÞts of a Þrm i ∈ I at stage 2 ("gross proÞts") then read
Applying the Kuhn-Tucker theorem to the maximization problem (2), for all i ∈ I,
which is binding ifq i < 1. 9 Note thatq i < 1 for some i ∈ I only if Q(q i ) is strictly convex for at least some q i ∈ (0, 1]. To see this, suppose to the contrary that Q(·) would not be strictly convex somewhere. Then π(α i |z) ≥ Q 0 (1) and 
and (ii)
According to Proposition 1, Þrms with high-quality intangible assets are not only more proÞtable but, if anything, also have wider market ranges than Þrms with low-quality intangible assets. If Q(·) is strictly convex, then α i > α j impliesq i >q j wheneverq j < 1. Fig. 1 provides a graphical representation of Proposition 1 in this case. Making use of (3), differences in gross proÞts of Þrms i and j are given by the shaded area.
<Please insert Figure 1 about here>
The next subsection shows that despite a completely symmetric situation of potential entrants in the economy, the quality of intangible assets (and, thus, proÞts as well as, possibly, market ranges) may indeed differ among Þrms in equilibrium, as an implication of the endogenous sorting of managers into head departments. For both the intuition of this central result and its implication for the size distribution of Þrms (discussed in section 5), the following auxiliary result will prove helpful.
9 Clearly, π( α i |z) > Q 0 (0) and thusq i > 0 in any equilibrium, because otherwise a Þrm would not enter the economy in the Þrst place. Also note that Π( α i |z) > 0 for all i ∈ I, according to (3), (4), π( α i |z) > Q 0 (0), the convexity of Q(·) and Q(0) = 0.
Lemma 1. (Convexity properties). Suppose
and, ifq i < 1 and Q 000 (q i ) ≤ 0, also
As will be seen below, strict convexity of reduced-form proÞts at stage 3, π( α i | ·), in α i gives rise to a complete segregation of Þrms by managerial skill.
Assignment of Managerial Skills (Stage 1)
The Þrms' decision problem at stage 1 is to choose the quality of intangible assets α i by hiring managers. First, deÞne a class of "assignment functions"
G describes the feasible hiring policies of a Þrm. At stage 1, each Þrm i ∈ I chooses an assignment functiong i ∈G. Depending on this hiring policy, the average
, the set of functionsg i ∈G, i ∈ I, determines the mapping α. It is helpful to redeÞne proÞts at stage 2 as function of Þrms' average managerial skill levelh i , i.e.,
We are now ready to set up conditions for an equilibrium at stage 1.
DeÞnition 2. (Equilibrium at stage 1). An equilibrium set of assignment functionsg * i ∈G, i ∈ I, together with a mapping w from H to R + (wage schedule), fulÞll the following conditions:
(a) Net proÞts are zero, i.e., for all i ∈ I,
(b) Given z * , no proÞtable deviation exists, i.e., for allg 0 i ∈G and for all i ∈ I,
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Condition (a) of DeÞnition 2 means that the total wage bill for managers employed in the head department of a Þrm (i.e., the endogenous sunk cost for the creation of intangible assets) is equal to its gross proÞt, i.e., net proÞts of all Þrms are zero in equilibrium. In view of free entry of Þrms into the economy and the competition of Þrms for managerial skills in a perfect labor market, this is a consistent requirement. With symmetry of potential entrants ex ante, the only possibility for a Þrm to become more proÞtable (in terms of gross proÞts at stage 2) than other Þrms is to attract higher-skilled managers on average. Higher gross proÞts of a Þrm just transmit into a higher average wage per manager of a Þrm. Also note that, in any equilibrium, Þrms must correctly foresee the competitive pressure z * , which results from optimizing behavior of Þrms at stages 1 and 2 (recall DeÞnition 1), as well as from product market competition at stage 3. Condition (b) reßects that, at stage 1, each Þrm maximizes proÞts taking both competitive pressure z * and the wage schedule w(h), h ∈ H, as given. To see this, note that for any given wage schedule w(h), h ∈ H, no Þrm i wants to deviate fromg * i ∈G (which leads to average skill
for all alternative assignment functionsg 0 i ∈G (leading toh 0 i ). Inequality (8) then directly follows from (9) by using the zero-proÞt condition (a). According to condition (c), all types h ∈ H from the potential pool of managers must at least receive the outside optionW (i.e., the wage rate for non-managerial labor). This implies f (h * i¯z * ) ≥ sW for all i ∈ I, i.e., sunk costs are bounded from below by sW . As argued in section 3.4, this determines the equilibrium measure of Þrms I * under free-entry. Condition (c) also says that the market for managerial skills must clear for any type h unless workers are paid their outside option. To see this, suppose
. This means that there is excess supply for man-agerial positions as workers seek the highest wage. However, this is inconsistent with a Walrasian equilibrium in the labor market. In contrast, if w(h) =W for some type h, then this type is indifferent whether or not to be assigned as manager.
Remark 1. DeÞnition 2 extends the equilibrium deÞnition in Saint-Paul (2001) to analyze the assignment of managerial skills to head departments of Þrms in an imperfect competition, multi-market context in which managers develop intangible assets. In contrast, Saint-Paul examines the relationship between technological change and wage inequality by studying the assignment of production workers to
Þrms under perfect competition. Formally, however, the basic model of Saint-Paul is a special case of the present framework in whichW = 0 (i.e., there is no outside wage option) and given by I * = 1/s in this case.
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We are now ready to derive the equilibrium wage structure. DeÞne the sets
which contain managerial skill levels (of a total mass s of types) hired in equilibrium by i ∈ I. Let S be a mapping which assigns a set S i to each Þrm i, called an equilibrium conÞguration of manager assignments. Also deÞne S := ∪ i∈I S i , i.e., S ⊆ H is the subset of managerial skill levels assigned to head departments in equilibrium. At stage 1, each Þrm i ∈ I chooses an assignment 10 As shown in section 3.4 and illustrated in appendix, ifW > 0, by contrast, the equilibrium measure of Þrms I * depends on all exogenous factors, i.e., besides on size s of head departments, on the product demand structure, the nature of product market competition, technologies, and the distribution of managerial skills. 
for all h ∈ S, with equality if h ∈ S i , i ∈ I;
(ii) there exists
According to part (i), within the head department of a Þrm i ∈ I (i.e., for all h ∈ S i ), the equilibrium wage schedule is colinear. This is a direct implication of the assumption that a Þrm i's quality of intangible assets α i depends on the average managerial skill levelh i it hires. The right-hand side of (10) gives the marginal beneÞt from hiring a manager of type h for a Þrm with average skill levelh * i under the zero-proÞt condition (7). Thus, in equilibrium, type h is not employed in such (ii) states that there is an endogenous cut-off ability level h min (i.e., a minimum skill) for managers. According to part (iii), workers whose managerial skills exceed those of the least skilled type h min assigned as manager have strictly higher earnings than their outside opportunityW in equilibrium (whereas w(h min ) =W if some workers of type h min are not assigned as manager, according to part (c) of DeÞnition 2). Finally, according to part (iv), any worker of typeh * i must obtain a wage rate equal to the average wage (or average gross proÞt, respectively) per manager in Þrm i (whether or not typeh * i is actually employed in Þrm i). Armed with the results of Proposition 2, the equilibrium assignment of managers is analyzed next. First, the following deÞnition is made. a 00 (·) > 0 ("increasing marginal returns to skill") implies complete segregation of skills in sorting equilibrium. As argued by Saint-Paul, this corresponds to the special case of an "O-ring" production function, analyzed by Kremer (1993) , in which workers exert spillovers on each other at all skill levels. In the present context, if the proÞt function at stage 3, π(α i | ·), is strictly convex in α i , and, for instance,
is strictly convex inh i , according to Lemma 1. As a result, according to Proposition 3, Þrms are completely segregated by managerial skill in equilibrium, even without intra-Þrm spillovers. In turn, Þrms differ in gross proÞts and, possibly, in market ranges, according to Proposition 1. As will be seen in section 4, strict convexity of proÞt functions in perceived product quality or the level of productivity, respectively, is indeed a natural property in standard imperfect competition models. Generally, and in contrast to the previous literature on job assignment, product market characteristics determine the equilibrium outcome of the sorting process. Assuming increasing marginal returns to skill in the technology to create intangible assets would just be an additional force towards asymmetric equilibria in the present analysis.
Second, strict concavity of f (h i¯z * ) inh i implies that all Þrms must have the same average managerial skill level in equilibrium. This directly follows from the fact (established in the proof of Proposition 3) that the wage schedule for managers in a more proÞtable Þrm cannot be less steep than in a less proÞtable Þrm.
The next proposition generally characterizes the equilibrium conÞguration of manager assignments which results from the endogenous sorting of managers into head departments of Þrms.
Proposition 4. (General sorting property). The equilibrium conÞguration of manager assignments S can be characterized by a partition of S = {h min , ..., h K } into adjacent subsets S ϕ , indexed ϕ ∈ Φ, which fulÞll the following. There exist
Proposition 4 says that, for instance, in an asymmetric equilibrium (i.e., wheneverh i 6 =h j for some i, j ∈ I), if Þrm i hires managers from some subset
. This also implies that the wage schedule within two Þrms which hire managers from the same subset S ϕ ⊆ H is the same in both Þrms, according to part (i) of Proposition 2.
Entry and the Number of Firms
This subsection shows how the equilibrium measure of Þrms, denoted I * , can be determined by observing the equilibrium conditions in DeÞnition 2 (in particular, condition (c)) together with Proposition 2. IfW = 0, then entry is restricted by the resource constraint for managerial types, i.e., I * = 1/s and h min = h 0 . Generally, allowing forW > 0, the equilibrium measure of Þrms is given by 
g(h min ) and w(h min ) (and thus h min ) must fulÞll
with
Together with (11), these relations simultaneously determineĝ(h min ), w(h min ) and I * in an equilibrium with complete segregation by managerial skill.
Second, suppose the equilibrium conÞguration of manager assignments S is symmetric. That is, all Þrms have the average quality of types assigned as manager, i.e.,
where (11) has been used for the latter equation. If S is symmetric, thenĝ(h min )
and w(h min ) (and thus h min ) fulÞll
, andh * as in equation (13).
Examples
This section characterizes the equilibrium in speciÞc models of imperfect (i.e., monopolistic) product market competition among Þrms at stage 3. (Existence of equilibrium is discussed in appendix.) It is illustrated that the coexistence of different types of Þrms (with different gross proÞts and market ranges, respectively), which stems from an asymmetric (e.g., hypersegregated) equilibrium conÞguration of manager assignments, is indeed likely to emerge in standard models. (Note that gross proÞts and market ranges are identical among Þrms if and only if the conÞguration of manager assignments is symmetric.)
Two monopolistic competition models are considered. The Þrst speciÞcation considers a version of the CES-utility model by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) , widely used in macroeconomic theory, which allows for asymmetric Þrms. The second speciÞcation assumes linear demand schedules (i.e., quadratic utility), along the lines of Ottaviano and Thisse (1999) , also extended for asymmetric Þrms.
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CES-Utility
Let markets be symmetric in the sense that both population size and the skill structure is identical in each market. Consumers and workers are immobile, i.e., are tied to their market location. In particular, managers work wherever they are located. That is, the Þrms' head departments are decentrally organized, i.e., cannot be attributed to a speciÞc market location. (These additional assumptions can be abandoned in the linear-demand model of section 4.2 in which product demand does not depend on aggregate income at a market location.) Each Þrm i produces one variety of a differentiated good at each of its plants. Labor is the only input in production. Firms have a constant-returns-to-scale technology, possibly differing in productivity β i of non-managerial labor. Normalizing the wage rate for production labor to unity (i.e.,W = 1), marginal production cost are given by 1/β i .
The utility function of the representative consumer in a market m is deÞned over a set N m of goods supplied in this market, and is given by the CES-index 
implies the following demand functions:
i ∈ N m , where
is the price index in market m.
P m is deÞned in a way such that indirect utility equals "real" expenditure E m /P m .
Firms take both aggregate expenditure E m and the price index P m as given in setting prices.
As shown in appendix B, the equilibrium proÞt of Þrm i ∈ N m from monopolistic product market competition at stage 3 takes the simple form
21 where α i := β i γ i and Ξ m := R i∈Nm (α i ) σ−1 di; L m denotes the aggregate amount of non-managerial labor, devoted to the production of goods, in market m. Note that, consistent with the general structure of the model, the quality of intangible assets of Þrm i can be summarized by a single parameter α i . Managers affect a Þrm's proÞts by determining either productivity β i (e.g., by creating an organizational structure) or perceived quality γ i (e.g., by designing products).
How can one conclude from (17) how the conÞguration of manager assignments is characterized in equilibrium? Let N m denote the measure of the set N m , i.e., the "number" of establishments in market m ∈ [0, 1]. As markets are symmetric ex ante, we focus on equilibria in which the composition of Þrm types is the same in each
where
For simplicity, let there be just two types of managerial skills in the economy, i.e.,
Now suppose that Þrms are completely segregated by managerial skill. It is now examined under which conditions this is consistent with an equilibrium. In order to avoid the discussion of many case distinctions, we focus on an equilibrium in which also (some) workers with skill h 0 are assigned as manager. That is, we look for an equilibrium with two types of Þrms, one that hires managers from type h 0 only and one that hires type h 1 only. Denote the respective sets of Þrms by I 0 and I 1 , with equilibrium measures I 0 and I 1 = I * − I 0 , respectively. Equilibrium mappings α * and q * are such that
respectively. With a share r ≡ I 0 /I * of Þrms with skill h 0 being active in each market m, the equilibrium number of Þrms in each market reads
11 Extension to the general case of K + 1 types is straightforward.
according to (18) . Moreover, as
where the latter equation is implied by (19). Finally, with a population size of unity in the economy, the equilibrium amount of production workers is given by L * = 1 − sI * (full employment). Hence, (17) can be rewritten as
for all i ∈ N m under hypersegregation with two Þrm types (recall z * = (α * , q * )). decreases in α k and q k , k = 0, 1 (i.e., proÞts at stage 3 decrease if competitive pressure, which is determined by the correctly foreseen equilibrium values Ξ * and
applying Lemma 1 and recalling f(h i¯· ) = Π( a(h i )¯·), the following result emerges from (21).
Proposition 5. (Monopolistic competition with CES-utility).
Under utility speciÞcation (15) with α i = β i γ i , if σ is sufficiently high, then the equilibrium conÞguration of manager assignments S is hypersegregated.
Proposition 5 provides an interesting intuition for the emergence of segregation of Þrms by managerial skill under monopolistic competition à la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) . A high price elasticity of demand σ (i.e., products are good substitutes such that monopoly power of Þrms is low, all other things equal) is associated with a high intensity of product market competition. Consequently, a given difference in the quality of intangible assets among Þrms becomes increasingly magniÞed into differences in proÞts at stage 3 (i.e., π( α i | z * ) is strictly convex in α i .) This has a symmetry-breaking feedback effect on the job assignment of managers, resulting from labor market competition. For instance, if a(·) is linear, then σ > 2 is sufficient for a hypersegregated conÞguration of manager assignments. Interestingly, starting from a symmetric equilibrium (which may exist for a low value of σ), the model is capable to generate the following comparative-static result. If the price elasticity of demand σ increases such that the equilibrium becomes asymmetric, some Þrms actually increase their market power by attracting better managers, while other Þrms see their (gross) proÞts shrink. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, a higher intensity of product market competition may give rise to the emergence of "global players"
in the Þrst place, characterized by (relatively) high gross proÞts and wide market ranges.
So far, existence of equilibrium has been supposed. In appendix C, the preceding example is used to illustrate how to prove existence of an equilibrium for the two polar cases of a hypersegregated and a symmetric equilibrium conÞguration of manager assignments, respectively.
Quadratic Utility
Next, consider monopolistic competition in each market m under quasi-linear preferences, adopted from Ottaviano and Thisse (1999) , which are represented by the following utility function over a set N m of "x−goods" and a numeraire commodity:
β ≥ γ > 0, where Y is the quantity of the numeraire. Again, labor is the only factor of production. One unit of the numeraire requires one unit of labor and is produced by perfectively competitive Þrms. That is, again,W = 1. A i indicates the perceived quality of goods supplied by Þrm i in any market it is active. Moreover, assume that production of one unit of x−goods requires c i units of labor in Þrm i. That is, again, Þrms may differ in both productivity and perceived product quality at any market location they enter.
From (22), the inverse demand function faced by Þrm i ∈ N m in market m reads
24
where X m := R j∈Nm x j,m dj is the total quantity of the x−good supplied in market m. Firms compete in quantities, correctly taking total output X m as given when maximizing proÞts at stage 3. 12 As shown in appendix B, the resulting proÞts at stage 3 for Þrm i ∈ N m read
where α i := A i − c i and
Analogously to the preceding CES-utility example, we have N * m = N * and Θ * m = Θ * for all m in an equilibrium. 13 Again, let H = {h 0 , h 1 }, and suppose α *
analogy to (20), we have
Thus, using (19) and (25), one can rewrite (24) to obtain
i ∈ N m . Note that π( α i | z * ) is quadratic in α i . Again, applying Lemma 1, the following result emerges from (26).
Proposition 6. (Monopolistic competition with quadratic utility). Under utility speciÞcation (22) with
For instance, complete segregation by managerial skill occurs if a(h i ) =h i . The same holds as long as a(·) is not "too concave". In fact, the considered linear-demand 12 As stated by Ottaviano and Thisse (1999, p. 10) , "a Þrm correctly neglects its impact on the market, but must explicitly account for the impact of the market on its proÞt" (italics original).
Assuming competition in prices, which requires horizontal differentiation of x−goods (i.e. β > γ),
would not alter the main conclusions from this example. 13 Generally, markets do not have to be identical ex ante, as long as Assumption 1 is fulÞlled. For instance, markets with 'low' demand may just attract fewer Þrms (or weaker Þrms in terms of the quality of their intangible assets, respectively). However, applicability of the proposed framework is much simpler by focussing on identical markets ex ante, as in the examples of this section.
model has similar features as often encountered in oligopoly theory, e.g. predicting that given differences in unit costs lead to increasing differences in proÞts. It is this property, which, typically, renders competition for managerial talent sufficiently intense to induce asymmetric sorting in the present framework.
Relation to Stylized Facts
This section discusses the empirical relevance of the model with respect to stylized facts regarding the size distribution of Þrms, and the relation of Þrm size to proÞtability, productivity, average managerial skills and managerial remuneration. Moreover, under weak conditions, this property gives rise to both strict convexity of Þrms' market ranges q * i in α i and hypersegregation of the equilibrium conÞgura-tion of manager assignments, according to Lemma 1 and Proposition 3, respectively.
Thus, the size distribution of Þrms and establishments tend to be convex mappings of the distribution of managerial skills in the upper tale of the skill distribution (which contains all types actually assigned as managers in equilibrium). In other words, small differences in the Þrms' managerial skill levels become magniÞed into increasingly larger differences in both proÞts (at stages 2 and 3) and market ranges.
Thus, the size distribution of Þrms and plants tends to be skewed to the right.
(ii) Firm size, proÞtability and market shares. As pointed out by Schmalensee (1989; stylized facts 4.11-4.13), in samples with many industries, U.S. Þrms (and business units) with higher market shares are also more proÞtable. Moreover, this result seems to be driven mainly by manufacturing industries with high advertisingto-sales ratios. Conventional measures of accounting proÞtability often treat outlays for advertising, R&D and the development of Þrm-speciÞc human capital as current expenses, although these raise future capabilities of Þrms. This practice, which (at least in the U.S.) is particularly adopted by large Þrms (Schmalensee, 1989 ; stylized fact 3.2), understates assets of Þrms. It has been argued that exactly this is the source of the often observed positive size-proÞtability relationship (Salamon (1985) ). All of these Þndings Þt well into the preceding analysis. According to the model, some Þrms are larger and have higher gross proÞts than others because they incur higher sunk costs for developing intangible assets. Although 'economic' proÞtability is the same across Þrms, accounting proÞtability may differ due to different accounting practices. Moreover, endogenous sunk costs (e.g., for advertising) are naturally high in industries in which intangible assets (like trademarks) play a signiÞcant role. This is consistent with a positive size-proÞtability relationship in advertising-intensive industries only.
(iii) Firm size, productivity and marginal costs. As reviewed by Bartelsman and Doms (2000) , there is a substantial degree of heterogeneity among both Þrms and establishments with respect to productivity levels. Longitudinal microdata suggest that these differences are related to differences in manager quality. Moreover, Roberts and Supina (2000) report a negative correlation between marginal costs and Þrm size among U.S. manufacturing Þrms. These Þndings are consistent with our theoretical result that the quality of management, which, e.g., determines the productivity of plants in the model, positively affects the size of Þrms in both dimensions (gross proÞts and market range) and the size of plants.
(iv) Sorting of managers. Evidence from matched employer-employee data strongly suggests that larger Þrms employ workers with higher average skill levels (e.g., Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) , Troske (1999) ). O'Shaughnessy, Levine and Capelli (2001) explicitly look at a measure for managerial skills, which is an index combining formal education with job requirements like problem-solving skills and predictability of tasks, known as 'Hay points'. They Þnd that average managerial skill levels substantially differ across Þrms.
14 This supports the asymmetric sorting hypothesis of managerial skills elaborated in this paper.
(v) Firm size and manager remuneration. Finally, there is overwhelming evidence for a positive relationship between Þrm size (or establishment size) and wages.
According to studies based on matched employer-employee data, a large part of this premium seems to be related to imperfectly observable skills, like managerial talent, together with a sorting of good managers in large Þrms. For instance, Troske (1999) controls for many Þrm-speciÞc characteristics which have been suggested by economic theory on size-wage differentials, still Þnding a substantial impact of Þrm size on wages. Also at the CEO level, larger Þrms pay substantially higher wages (Conyon and Murphy (2000) ). Moreover, O'Shaughnessy, Levine and Capelli (2001) Þnd that their measure of managerial skills ('Hay points') is a good predictor for wages. In fact, our model predicts that the earnings distribution for managers tends to be skewed to the right. To see this, recall that, according to the model, gross profits per manager are equal to the average earnings of managers within Þrms. Thus, for instance, under complete segregation of Þrms by managerial skill, the distribution of manager wages mimics the distribution of gross proÞts. As argued above, the latter tends to be skewed to the right. This magniÞcation of skill differences in increasingly larger earning differentials resembles the famous superstar economy of Rosen (1981) , however, for a different reason. Rosen (1981) derives a strictly 14 Even when controlling for job level and function, the authors report a standard deviation of the Þrm effect in a regression of Hay points on several controls of 13.7 percent in 1986 and 12.7 percent in 1992.
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convex mapping from individual ability to individual earnings from the ability of more talented individuals (acting as atomistic Þrms) to cover a wider range of markets. In Rosen (1982) , a similar magniÞcation effect arises with respect to manager remuneration due to a complementarity between supervisory skills and the span of control. In contrast, in the present analysis, managers develop intangible assets;
and differences in the Þrms' quality of intangible assets tend to become magniÞed in proÞt differences. In turn, these proÞt differences determine earnings differences of managers.
Conclusion
This paper has focussed on the interaction between product market characteristics and the market for managerial skills. Intangible assets like the organizational structure of a Þrm, Þrm-speciÞc knowledge, product design, trademarks, etc., play a key role for the performance of Þrms. Development of intangible assets is the responsibility of management. Consequently, and according to the main hypothesis of this paper, managerial quality is a crucial factor for the productivity of Þrms and the perceived quality of products. It has been argued that, under free entry of ex ante identical Þrms and geographical non-rivalry of intangible assets, the nature of product market competition determines how heterogeneous managerial skills sort into head departments. In turn, this sorting process determines the goods market structure at single locations and the size distribution of Þrms in the economy.
Standard imperfect competition models imply that given differences among Þrms in productivity or product quality transmit into increasingly larger differences in proÞts. This property is related to a high intensity of product market competition.
It has been shown that, under this condition, Þrms tend to differ endogenously in two dimensions of Þrm size: gross proÞts (typically related to a Þrms' output, sales or employment level) and the number of plants (market ranges). Thus, paradoxically, if symmetry breaks down due to an increase in the intensity of product market competition, "global players" with high market power may emerge in the Þrst place.
In particular, the main results of this paper are consistent with the well-known regularity that the size distribution of Þrms and establishments within industries is skewed to the right. Moreover, the model predicts that Þrm size is positively related to productivity, proÞtability, average managerial skills and average managerial wages. Thus, the model is not only capable to explain why Þrms differ in general, but provides a uniÞed framework which is consistent with speciÞc observations about market structures, sorting of managers in Þrms and managerial remuneration.
Appendix
A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Part (i) is proven Þrst. If 0 <q i < 1, such that condition (4) is binding and Q 00 (q i ) > 0 must hold, we have
> 0 from part (i) of Assumption 1 and the implicit function theorem. To prove part (ii), note that, whenever 0 <q i < 1,
is strictly positive, according to (4) and
This concludes the proof.
¤
Proof of Lemma 1. First, note that
according to (A.2). Ifq i < 1, then ∂q i ∂α i > 0 and both terms in square brackets vanish, according to (4) and (A.1), respectively. Ifq i = 1, the latter two summands in (A.3) also vanish. Thus,
must hold and use (A.1) to obtain
Thus, given, each Þrm i ∈ I chooses an assignment functiong i ∈G (determiningh i and
Setting up the Kuhn-Tucker problem with multiplier λ i on the constraint P h∈Hg (h) = s for Þrm i ∈ I, the necessary optimality conditions forg i (h), h ∈ H, are given by
with strict equality ifg * i (h) > 0. This implies the following. Either each Þrm i hires only one type of manager or for any two different types h,ĥ ∈ S i , we have
Multiplying both sides of (A.6) withg * i (h) and summing yields .6) and observing condition (a) of DeÞnition 2 yields (10). This proves part (i).
In order to prove part (ii), Þrst, suppose there exist types h ∈ S andĥ / ∈ S such that h <ĥ. It is now shown that this is only possible if w(h) < w(ĥ). For this end, suppose w(h) ≥ w(ĥ) and suppose Þrm i replaces some managers of type h by some 31 of typeĥ, choosing an assignment function g 0 i ∈G instead of g * i ∈G. Total wage costs of Þrm i are then given by
As this violates (9) and, thus, equilibrium condition (b) of DeÞnition 2, we have w(h) < w(ĥ) =W , where the latter equation follows fromĥ / ∈ S. However, this is impossible because type h would then prefer not to work as manager. Thus, h ≥ĥ for all h ∈ S andĥ / ∈ S,
i.e., there exists a cut-off level h min ∈ H such that h ≥ h min for all h ∈ S. With
.., h K }, the set S of types assigned as manager equals {h min , ..., h K },
In order to prove part (iii), note that w(h min ) ≥W , with strict equality if not all types h min are managers, according to condition (c) of DeÞnition 2. As some workers of type h min are employed as managers (note that h min is the least skilled type of worker assigned as manager), w(h) >W for all h > h min directly follows from part (i).
Finally, to prove part (iv), note that (10) 
according to (7). Also note that wage cost w(h 
.) Given z * , total wage costs for managerial workers in Þrm i then read
and (A.7) have been used. Usingh
Moreover, gross proÞts of Þrm i now read f (h 0 i¯z * ). According to condition (b) of DeÞnition 2, the considered deviation must not to be proÞtable for Þrm i, i.e.,
which can be rewritten as
. However, this is impossible if f (h i¯z * ) is strictly convex inh i ; thus, S i = {h * i }. In view of DeÞnition 3, this proves that the conÞguration of manager assignments S is hypersegregated under strict convexity of f (h i¯z * ) inh i (at equilibrium levels).
It remains to be shown thath * i =h * for all i in any equilibrium if f (h i¯z * ) is strictly concave inh i (at equilibrium levels). To see this, note that (10) implies .15) and
respectively. Without loss of generality, supposeh * i >h * j for some i, j ∈ I, i 6 = j. (A.15) and (A.16) then imply
However, (17) and (24) Derivation of equation (17): Remember that, at any market m ∈ [0, 1], the production function of each Þrm i ∈ N m is given by
where l i,m is the amount of production labor employed in Þrm at market m. Thus, (16) . Hence, the proÞt-maximizing price for variety i at market m is given by
Using both equations (16) and (B.2), for any i, j ∈ N m , we have
Moreover, according to production function (B.1), we have
. Thus, we 
C. Derivation and Existence of Equilibrium
This appendix illustrates in an exemplary way how to prove existence of an equilibrium (also sketching its full derivation) in the CES-utility case of section 4.1.
First, as in the main text, consider a hypersegregated equilibrium conÞguration of manager assignments with two types of Þrms. In such an equilibrium, we have I 0 =ĝ(h 0 )/s and the equilibrium measure of Þrms I * reads
according to equation (11). Thus, the equilibrium share of Þrms with low-skilled managers r = I 0 /I * is given by
The cost function Q(·) for entering single markets is assumed to have a simple isoelastic form:
with F ≥ 0 and η ≥ 1. Note that F = 0 or η = 1 implies q * i = 1 for all i ∈ I. Suppose, however, for the sake of concreteness, that all Þrms have limited market ranges, i.e., q * i ∈ (0, 1), i ∈ I. Note that, with limited market ranges, q * i fulÞlls π(α i | z * ) = Q 0 (q * i ), according to DeÞnition 1 and condition (4). Thus, using (C.3), we have according to (C.6). This must yield q k ∈ (0, 1) for k = 0, 1 andĝ(h 0 ) ∈ (0, g(h)) to be consistent with the supposed equilibrium. Moreover, in view of (C.6), existence of this equilibrium can be conÞrmed if a(h i ) (σ−1)η η−1 is strictly convex inh i at bothh i = h 0 andh i = h 1 , according to Proposition 3. Thus, we have derived all endogenous variables as functions of the "fundamentals" of the economy: skill endowments h 0 , h 1 in supply g(h 0 ), g(h 1 ), demand parameter σ, technology parameters F and η from speciÞcation (C.3), the function a(·) and the size s of head departments. Under appropriate assumptions about these fundamentals, the supposed equilibrium exists. Second, analogously, suppose the conÞguration of manager assignment is symmetric, i.e.,h * i =h * and, thus, α * i = a(h * ) and q * i = q * for all i ∈ I. For simplicity, let Q(·) ≡ 0 such that q * = 1. Hence, Ξ m = Ξ * = I * a(h * ) σ−1 for all m. Again, let there be two skill types h 0 and h 1 , h 0 < h 1 , both types being assigned as manager.
Using this together with q * = 1, Q(1) = 0 and L * = 1 −ĝ(h 0 ) − g(h 1 ) (labor market clearing), one obtains 9) according to (3), (6), (17) and (C.1). Thus, we have
and ∂f(h * ¯z * )
respectively, whereh * = h 0ĝ (h 0 )+h 1 g(h 1 ) g(h 0 )+g(h 1 )
, according to equation (13). Using equations (14), (C.10) and (C.11), as well as h 0 = h min and w(h 0 ) =W = 1,ĝ(h 0 ) is given by
A symmetric equilibrium exists if this yieldsĝ(h 0 ) ∈ (0, g(h)) and a(h i ) σ−1 is strictly concave inh i ath i =h * . Finally,
